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INCOMPLETE APPROACH, INCORRECT OUTCOME:
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, AND
THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF WEISE V. CASPER
INTRODUCTION

The public policy and political rhetoric of the last several decades
has reflected a societal interest in efficient government and streamlined
state action.' Partly as a result of such concerns, the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of qualified immunity.2 Because constant litigation
could significantly burden public officials, qualified immunity was developed to give lower-level public officials a line of defense against lawsuits stemming from their official actions. 3 Over time, this doctrine has
evolved through judicial efforts to balance public efficiency with the
right to private recompense.4
Qualified immunity is a recently developed product of judicial reasoning; freedom of expression, on the contrary, has been a foundational
element of constitutional democracy in the United States. As legal and
political authorities have routinely noted, the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech has been a treasured and revered cornerstone of America's public discourse.5 Whereas courts have added a litany of exceptions
and caveats to other constitutional guarantees, the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause has remained sacrosanct and largely untouched.7
Complications arise, however, when public officials claim qualified
immunity for acts that seemingly run contrary to constitutional guaran1. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, A Time for Choosing (Oct. 27, 1964), available at
http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganChoosingl964.html; REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA,
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
2. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974) ("[1]t is important to note, even at the
outset, that one policy consideration seems to pervade the analysis: the public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the protection of the public."); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting that actions for damages against public officers involve social
costs including "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public
issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office"); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (warning that unfettered litigation against public officials "would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge
of their duties").
3. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (emphasizing the importance of "the need to protect officials
who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority" (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978))).
4. See id. at 813-14.
5. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Compelling Lessons in the First Amendment, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 795, 798-809 (2002) (reviewing MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE'S
DARLING PRIVILEGE: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000)).
6.
See, e.g., 68 AM. JUR. 2DSearches and Seizures § 49 (2010) (listing numerous exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on search and seizure in absence of a warrant).
7. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1701-02
(1991) (tracing the developments in First Amendment interpretation).
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tees.8 In Weise v. Casper,9 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
a unique factual scenario featuring a clash between First Amendment
rights and executive volunteers' claims of qualified immunity.10 Utilizing
an abridged legal analysis, the Weise court held that executive officials
could eject a citizen from a public speech solely on the basis of that citizen's prior expression on an issue of public concern."
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit employed incomplete
legal analyses in deciding the qualified immunity and viewpoint discrimination questions in Weise. As a result of this incomplete approach,
the Tenth Circuit's decision raises troubling concerns for public accountability, active citizenship, and constitutional development. Part I examines the evolution of the qualified immunity standard and describes the
modern test used to evaluate immunity claims by public officials. Part II
analyzes federal law controlling free speech and viewpoint discrimination issues. Part III outlines the Tenth Circuit's decision in Weise and
focuses on the majority's legal approach to the qualified immunity and
viewpoint discrimination issues present in the dispute. Part IV argues
that the Weise court used an incomplete approach in evaluating the defendants' qualified immunity claims, and employed a similarly incomplete approach in evaluating the plaintiffs' freedom of expression arguments. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit issued a ruling with troubling implications for civil rights litigants, politically expressive citizens, and constitutional development.
I. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD

A. The Originsof QualifiedImmunity
A public official's immunity from suit is a concept that finds roots
in English common law. 12 The King originally held absolute immunity
because English society widely accepted that a citizen could not bring an
action against the crown in a court licensed by the King.' 3 Eventually,
14
English law evolved to allow suits against the King by royal consent.
Absolute immunity for English judges was similarly a feature of English

8. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389-90 (1971); see also Harlow,457 U.S. at 819.
9. 593 F.3d 1163 (10thCir. 2010),cert. denied, 131 S.Ct.7.
10. Id. at 1165-66.
11.
Id. at l70.
12. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1963); Adam L. Littman, A Second Line of Defense for Public Officials Asserting
QualifiedImmunity: What "ExtraordinaryCircumstances" Prevent Officialsfrom Knowing the Law
Governing their Conduct?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 645, 648 (2008); Gilbert Sison, A King No
More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine ofHead ofState Immunity, 78 WASH. U.
L. Q. 1583, 1584-1588 (2000).
13.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); Jaffe, supra note 12, at 2, 4.
14. See Jaffe, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that petitions of right requiring the King's consent
allowed English citizens to seek relief against the Crown); see also Littman, supra note 12, at 648.
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common law.15 Finally-though it involved a long and protracted struggle-the English Bill of Rights of 1689 granted members of Parliament
absolute immunity from criminal or civil action related to their official
speech and actions. 16
Such were the norms that dwelled within the minds of America's
founding fathers. In the United States, absolute immunity for Congressmen and Senators has constitutional roots in the Speech or Debate
Clause, which protects all members of Congress from official reprisal for
their political acts.17 American common law also recognizes absolute
civil immunity for the President when the suit stems from official actions.18 Similarly, common law has granted judges and prosecutors absolute immunity for actions taken in the discharge of their duties.19
Apart from the President, judges, and prosecutors, there are countless other public officials. Consequently, qualified immunity developed
as a defense for these officials who could not claim the broad protections
of absolute immunity.20 Typically, this defense applies when a state or
local official faces individual liability for a constitutional tort in a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action, or when a federal official faces individual liability
for a constitutional tort through a Bivens action. 21 Absolute and qualified
immunity differ in important ways. While absolute immunity grants
high-ranking officials complete immunity from any civil action involving
their official duties, 2 2 qualified immunity shields other officials carrying
out their duties only under certain circumstances.23
The Supreme Court's first discussion of qualified immunity came in
Pierson v. Ray,24 a case where civil rights protestors sued individual po15. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240 n.4 (describing the civil and criminal immunity for English
judges for "abuse of his jurisdiction").
16. Id. at 240-41.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
18. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) ("[W]e hold that petitioner, as a former
President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on
his official acts."); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705-06 (1997) (holding that private
actions against the President are not precluded by the separation of powers doctrine, even while the
President is still in office).
19.
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 350 (1871) (declaring that judges are held accountable
through the possibility of legislative impeachment rather than the possibility of private legal action);
see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976) (holding that prosecutors are completely
immune from common law tort and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, and that criminal law is the appropriate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct).
20. See Littman, supra note 12, at 648-49.
21.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (conferring a cause of action against state or local officials acting
under color of state law who deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights); see also Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (granting an
identical cause of action against federal officials who act under color of federal law and commit
constitutional torts).
22. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749-52.
23.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (holding that public officials are
entitled to qualified immunity only in circumstances where their conduct does not violate a clearly
established constitutional right).
24.
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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lice officers in a § 1983 action. 2 5 At the time, the common law allowed a
defense of good faith for law enforcement officers facing damages actions for torts.26 The defense gave officers immunity from suit if they
believed in good faith and with probable cause that their duty required
the actions in question,27 and in Pierson the Supreme Court extended this
defense to public officials facing § 1983 damage actions. 2 8 Seven years
after Pierson, the Court again confronted the qualified immunity issue in
Scheuer v. Rhodes,29 a case involving civil damages stemming from the
actions of National Guard officers during the famous anti-war protests of
1970 at Kent State University. 30 In Scheuer, the Court referred to the
affirmative defense outlined in Pierson as "qualified immunity" and explicitly added an objective element to the good-faith defense. 3 ' Describing the new standard, the Court stated that "[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course
of official conduct." 3 2 By coupling an official's subjective good-faith
belief with an objective requirement of reasonableness, the Supreme
Court forged the elements of the modem qualified immunity standard.
B. The Modern QualifiedImmunity Standard
The modern standard for the qualified immunity defense first ap33
Featuring some of the same actors as
peared in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
3 4 Harlow
the landmark executive immunity case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
35
involved a damages action against presidential aides. The Court rejected the aides' argument of derivative absolute immunity and held that
only qualified immunity applied to executive personnel.36 Moreover, the
25. Id. at 551-52 (1967). The plaintiffs in Pierson alleged that, while trying to desegregate a
bus terminal, they were unconstitutionally arrested by three Mississippi police officers. Id at 54850.
26. Id at 555 (citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 (1965)).
27. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (describing the defendants' claim that an arrest made in good
faith should not make defendants liable under § 1983).
28. Id at 557 ("We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of
Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment,
is also available to them in the action under § 1983.").
29. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
30. Id at 234-35 (1974).
31.
Id. at 247 ("These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is
available to officers of the executive branch of govemment, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.").
32. Id. at 247-48.
33. 457 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1982).
34. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
35. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. Plaintiff Fitzgerald claimed that defendants conspired to terminate his employment in a manner that violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Id.
36. Id. at 810-11 ("Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, however, it sweeps
too far.... The undifferentiated extension of absolute 'derivative' immunity to the President's aides
therefore could not be reconciled with the 'functional' approach that has characterized the immunity
decisions of this Court . . .").
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Court expressed concern over the subjective good-faith element of the
qualified immunity defense; because many courts regarded a public official's subjective belief as a question of fact, it was therefore conceivable
that many insubstantial claims could thwart early dismissal attempts and
proceed to trial. 37 Consequently, the Court eliminated the subjective element of the qualified immunity defense and imposed a purely objective
standard: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."08
Since Harlow, the Supreme Court has made notable structural alterations to the qualified immunity standard. Saucier v. Katz, 39 a Supreme Court decision addressing qualified immunity in the face of alleged Fourth Amendment violations, crafted a two-pronged test for determining qualified immunity using the elements identified in Harlow.40
First, Saucier required that lower courts must examine whether the actions alleged by the plaintiff show an actual constitutional violation.4 1 If
a court found that a violation had occurred, only then could it consider
the second prong of the standard: whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. 4 2 The Court recently modified the or4 3 Acknowledging
dinal nature of this test in Pearson v. Callahan.
that the
ordered nature of the Saucier procedure contradicted an interest in preserving judicial resources, the Pearson Court removed the sequential
aspect of the qualified immunity standard and allowed courts to address
the two prongs in the order of their choosing. 44 Since the Pearson decision, courts have thus been free to exercise one of two options: quickly
dispose of "close call" cases by addressing the clearly established prong,
or examine whether the alleged facts establish a constitutional tort by
addressing the violation prong.
While an alleged violation is nearly always a matter of fact and circumstance, the "clearly established" prong presents a more muddled inquiry of law and reasonableness. The essential question, as stated by the
Supreme Court, is whether a reasonable public official would have "fair
37.
Id. at 815-16 (noting the procedural difficulties imposed by FED. R. CIv. P. 56 and a
factual finding of good faith).
38. Id. at 818.
39. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
40. Id at 201.
41.
Id. ("A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this
threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.").
42. Id. ("[Ilf a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions,
the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.").
43.
129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
44. Id. at 818 ("The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.").
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notice that her conduct was unlawful." 45 Other cases, both before and
after Pearson, provide important considerations when considering the
question of fair notice.
The most notable consideration in "clearly established" inquiries
involves the idea of factual novelty. On one hand, the Court has stated
that inquiries regarding whether a constitutional right was clearly established "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition. ,,46 However, the Court has also cautioned
that qualified immunity inquiries cannot become an exercise in circumstantial repetition. In United States v. Lanier,47 the Court addressed
unique facts involving a state judge accused of sexually assaulting several litigants.4 8 The appeals court overturned the ruling against the judge
on the grounds that no controlling authority clearly established the rights
of the plaintiffs. 4 9 Despite the novel facts of Lanier, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit and stated that the establishment of a right did not require "fundamentally similar" factual precedent.50 The Court formalized
this concept in Hope v. Pelzer,5 i a case where Alabama prison officials
handcuffed prisoners to outdoor "hitching posts" for hours at a time. 52 In
finding that an Eighth Amendment right existed for the prisoners, the
Court stated that "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." 53 Thus,
Lanier and Hope stand for the idea that the existence of a right can be
sufficiently clear even if the exact actions in question need not have been
previously declared unlawful.54
Ultimately, all qualified immunity inquiries involving the clear establishment of a right must include two components: (1) an examination
of whether a public official has "fair notice" that her conduct is unlawful,
45. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
46. Saucier,533 U.S. at 201.
47. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
48. Id at 261. Though Lanier involved a criminal action under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and not a civil
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens, the Supreme Court later used the Lanier analysis in formulating novelty jurisprudence for qualified immunity claims in § 1983 and Bivens actions. See, e.g.,
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 731 (2002).
49. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 263.
50. Id. at 269 ("Nor have our decisions demanded precedents that applied the right at issue to
a factual situation that is 'fundamentally similar' at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit
in using that phrase. To the contrary, we have upheld convictions under § 241 or § 242 despite
notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so
long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.").
51.
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
52. Id. at 733-34, 741.
53. Id. at 741.
54. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; Lanier,520 U.S. at 269; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987) ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful
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and (2) an examination of whether that conduct manifests itself in novel
fact patterns. In balancing fair notice concerns with this novelty inquiry,
the modem qualified immunity standard features a refined yet flexible
analysis for complicated questions of law and fact.
II. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

It would be fair to characterize the body of law surrounding qualified immunity as complex and nuanced. By contrast, the law concerning
viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment is a veritable model
of clarity and consistency. The First Amendment guarantees, in relevant
part, that state actors shall not abridge "freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. ",55 As evidenced by the country's speedy ratification of the Bill of Rights, the new Americanssuddenly free from restrictive British rule-saw these freedoms as essential to a functioning republic.56 By the mid-Twentieth Century, the judicial system began consistently referring to these freedoms as the singular
right to "freedom of expression."57
Numerous types of speech are protected under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression.5 However, the right to express unpopular views on matters of social concern is perhaps the most
well recognized of all First Amendment protections. Born of colonial
discontent with England's practice of quashing American cries for political reform, the First Amendment's most invariant and revered feature has
been the protection of political and social dissent.5 9 In a case protecting
the right of Jehovah's Witness students to remain silent during their public school's recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, Justice Jackson eloquently stated, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or

55.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. See Brian J. Buchanan, About the First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Mar. 7,
2011, 2:47:17 AM), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item-about firstamd.
57. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (holding that freedom of expression is
"derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against federal encroachment upon
freedom of speech and belief"); see also Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976, 980 (1969) ("[T]he First
Amendment did not build on existing law; it broke with tradition, set a new standard, and exalted
freedom of expression."); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941) ("[T]he same standards of
Freedom of expression as, under the First Amendment, are applicable to the federal government.").
58. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591-92 (2010) (declaring that the First
Amendment protects unseemly depictions of animal cruelty from overbroad government censorship); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972) (holding that reporters are entitled to question public officials and seek the news under the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 448-49 (1969) (protecting speech that promoted violence as a means of accomplishing social
reform).
59. See Yassky, supra note 7, at 1701-02 (arguing that the First Amendment's protections
have evolved in response to various historical challenges, such as the Civil War and Great Depression).
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force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 60 Over thirty
years ago, a circuit judge bluntly noted that a citizen's views on policy
and politics is "entitled to the greatest constitutional protection." 6' As the
Tenth Circuit recently stated, "[V]iewpoint discrimination is almost universally condemned and rarely passes constitutional scrutiny." 62
Such statements accurately reflect the judiciary's approach to affirmatively protecting the right to express or disavow a certain point of
view. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has shown little reluctance in
ruling against state actors that retaliate on the basis of viewpoint. Direct
retaliation for viewpoint expression is explicitly prohibited in nearly all
circumstances. An example came in Rankin v. McPherson.63 McPherson,
a public employee, was dismissed for remarking during a political conversation that she hoped a future assassination attempt against President
Reagan would be successful.64 The Court characterized the employee's
speech as a viewpoint on a matter of public concern and held that a citizen's interest in making such statements outweighed any State interest in
controlling such remarks.65 Even actions that merely deprive, rather than
retaliate, are often impermissible. The Court held in Good News Club v.
Milford CentralSchool66 that a public school's prohibition of a Christian
children's club use of school facilities for its after-hours meetings was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Similarly, Congress cannot
bar government-sponsored attorneys in welfare proceedings from taking
cases that directly challenge certain welfare law provisions. 68
A review of Supreme Court holdings reveals that viewpoint discrimination is only permissible in a handful of special circumstances.
One example of such circumstances involves speech made by public
employees during the discharge of their duties; these matters often result
in litigation against a public employer, and courts have held that dismissal of a public employee is appropriate if the employee's speech is
related to ordinary matters of duty rather than matters of public concern. Another special circumstance involves the expression of public
60. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
61.
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975).
62. Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1047 (10th Cir. 1999).
63. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
64. Id at 380-81.
65. Id at 391-92. The Court made this determination because McPherson's statement did not
disrupt the normal functioning of the office, and because the statement was not public and in no way
discredited the office. In the absence of these mitigating circumstances, the Court ruled that a dismissal essentially based on political opinion cannot be maintained. Id.
66. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
67. Id. at 120 ("When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited
public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club
because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.").
68. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) ("The Constitution does not
permit the Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner.").
69. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (upholding the dismissal of a
former deputy prosecutor for distributing an insubordinate questionnaire to fellow employees).
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school students.70 In such matters, the Court again recognized a narrow
exception to the general prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, stating
that the First Amendment does not require school officials to permit
speech reasonably seen as promoting drug use. 71 Absent any special circumstances-such as employment-related or student speech-the First
Amendment completely and thoroughly bars viewpoint discrimination of
any kind.
III. WEISE V. CASPER
A. Facts and ProceduralPosture

On March 21, 2005, President George W. Bush delivered a speech
at a museum in Denver, Colorado.72 Tickets were available to the public. 7 3 Plaintiffs Leslie Weise and Alex Young obtained tickets through a
congressman's office and arrived at the event in a personal vehicle with a
bumper sticker reading "No More Blood for Oil." 74 Upon approaching
the venue, an executive volunteer who had noticed the bumper sticker
stopped Weise and warned her against any sort of disruption. The staff
and volunteers at the event allowed Weise and Young to enter, but then
conferred to discuss a policy set by a White House official that prohibited the presence of political dissenters at Presidential events.76 After
conferring, one of the defendants then ejected Weise and Young from the
event.77 The plaintiffs were not permitted to re-enter the museum, and the
executive staff later confirmed that the plaintiffs were ejected due to their
bumper sticker.78 Neither plaintiff disrupted the event at any time, and
both claimed that they never had an intention to do so.79
Weise and Young brought a Bivens action against each of the executive staff volunteers involved in their dismissal from the President's

70. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (noting that government entities can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public speech).
71.
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 409-10 (2007) (holding that a principal's
confiscation of a student's banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" was permissible given the time
and setting of a school function).
72. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7.
73.
Id. The procedure for obtaining tickets involved claiming the tickets through a U.S. Representative's office by producing identification and signing one's name onto a ticket list. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. ("[Defendant] Casper told [Plaintiff] Weise that 'she had been ID'd' ... and 'that if
she had any ill intentions' or 'tried any funny stuff that [she] would be arrested, but that he was
going to let [her] in."') (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. ("Sometime before the President's speech, the White House Advance Office established a policy of excluding those who disagree with the President from the President's official
public appearances.").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. According to the record, Young would have asked President Bush a question "if given
the opportunity." Id. at 1165-66.
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speech.80 All defendants named in the action asserted the defense of
qualified immunity.8 ' In the first series of proceedings, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado granted qualified immunity to
the defendants. 8 2 Plaintiffs made an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth
Circuit on the qualified immunity issue, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal due to insufficient facts regarding the defendants'
statuses as executive branch officials. 8 3 Upon remand and after further
discovery, the district court found that all defendants named in the plaintiffs' complaint were either executive staff members or volunteers "acting under close government supervision." 84 Based on this finding, the
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified
immunity, and the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Tenth Circuit.85
B. Majority Opinion
A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the district court's grant of qualified immunity de novo.86 The majority,
in an opinion authored by Judge Kelly, upheld the district court's ruling
and declared that the defendants were entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.87
The court identified the two-part qualified immunity test as controlling in the matter.8 Pursuant to the elective approach outlined in Pearson, the majority chose to begin its analysis by addressing the "clearly
established" prong of the qualified immunity test.89 At the outset, the
court declared that a clearly established right required a "Supreme Court
or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains." 90 The court also noted that, per the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hope, the specific actions at issue in a case need not have been
80. Id. at 1165; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (establishing a cause of action against federal officials who, acting under
color of federal law, commit a constitutional tort).
81.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1166.
82. Id.
83.
Id.
84. See id. As a result of the district court's enhanced inquiry, the record in the instant case
characterized the defendants as executive actors carrying out executive instructive policies. Id. at
1165.
85.
Id. at 1166.
86. Id.at 1165-66.
87. Id. at 1165, 1170.
88. Id at 1166-67; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (discussing the "clearly
established" and "violation" prongs of the qualified immunity test first articulated in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1166; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) ("The
89.
judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.").
90.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir.
2007) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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previously held unlawful by controlling precedent.9 1 However, "in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 92
The majority then shifted its analysis toward the question of apparent unlawfulness. With little equivocation, the court stated that broad
propositions of law alone cannot defeat a claim of qualified immunity;
only in exceptional circumstances will such propositions suffice. 93 While
the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were correct in their argument
that the government usually cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,94 its opinion made clear that a more precise inquiry was appropriate. Instead of focusing on the broader context of the First Amendment,
the court addressed the narrower question of whether a reasonable public
official would know that ejecting the plaintiffs on the basis of their
bumper sticker-or, previous expression-was unlawful.
The court concluded that no First Amendment doctrine (1) prohibited the government from excluding the plaintiffs from an official speech
open to the public and (2) protected the plaintiffs' presence at the President's speech. 9 6 Because the speech itself-the plaintiffs bumper
sticker-occurred outside the event, the majority found that the plaintiffs
were not speakers for the purposes of a First Amendment inquiry.97
Though acknowledging that a bumper sticker is a protected form of expression, the court held that the plaintiffs past expression was legally
unrelated to the plaintiffs actual ejection. 98 The court explored several
cases involving the ejection of attendees from Presidential events, but
deemed that none of the cases were instructive on the issue of an attendee's previously expressed viewpoint. 99 Because no authority gave the
Tenth Circuit direct guidance in considering exclusion based on prior
expression, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' attendance was not a
clearly established constitutional right.100 Therefore, the majority granted
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1167; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ("[O]fficials
91.
can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.").
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
92.
93.
Id ("[E]xcept in the most obvious cases, broad, general propositions of law are insufficient to suggest clearly established law.").
94. Id
Id. at 1168 ("Plaintiffs simply have not identified any First Amendment doctrine that
95.
prohibits the government from excluding them from an official speech on private property.
96. Id at 1168-69.
Id. ("At the event itself, Plaintiffs were 'not speakers at all,' as their counsel conceded at
97.
oral argument, but rather attendees.").
98.
Id. The majority stated that, while some precedential authority speaks to the issue of
political dissenters being excluded from Presidential events, the critical distinction in the instant case
is that Weise and Young did not attempt to express themselves in a public forum. Id at 1169-70.
Rather, Weise and Young were excluded on the basis of past expression outside of the public forum
in question. Id.
99. Id. at 1169-70.
100. Id. at 1170 (noting that, because the cases cited by Weise and Young dealt with expression in the public forum rather than previously expressed viewpoint, these cases could not constitute
clearly established law).
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qualified immunity to the executive volunteers and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.o
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Holloway dissented from the majority's finding of qualified
immunity. 10 2 In a sharply worded opinion, the judge took issue with the
majority's reasoning on both qualified immunity and First Amendment
grounds.10 3
First, Judge Holloway's dissent noted that the plaintiffs' bumper
sticker "expressed an opinion on a matter of great public concern."' 04 In
the context of First Amendment precedent, the dissent thus saw this as
speech entitled to the maximum level of constitutional protection.105 As
Judge Holloway noted, discrimination between those supporting government policies and those who do not is flatly impermissible."o' Furthermore, expression on matters of public concern is shielded from official reprisal of any kind.107
Judge Holloway's finding of protected expression strongly influenced the remainder of his analysis. Because First Amendment precedent
weighed strongly in favor of the plaintiffs' right to express their opinion
on a matter of public concern, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs had a
"clearly established" constitutional right under the applicable prong of
the qualified immunity test.'0 8 Moreover, the dissent also noted that the
Supreme Court's warnings of novelty in Hope v. Pelzer made it unnecessary for the plaintiffs to present factually analogous precedent; rather,
general statements of the law that apply in obvious ways can fulfill the
"clearly established" requirement. 0 9
In addressing the second prong of whether a violation actually occurred, Judge Holloway stated that Casper and the other executive volunteers ran directly afoul of the First Amendment.' 10 The dissent concluded
that the ejection clearly violated the plaintiffs' rights.", Weise and
Young gave no indication of trouble and made no attempt to disrupt the

101.
Id.
102. Id. (Holloway, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1171-72.
104. Id. at 1170.
105. Id. at 1171 (citing Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975)).
106.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1175 (citing Glasson, 518 F.2d at 912).
107. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1174-75 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1171 ("1 would hold that the rights so violated were clearly established
108.
because of the fundamental importance of the right of free speech on topics of public concern . . .
109. Id. at 1177 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 741 (2002)).
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1171 ("[N]o reasonable officer could have believed that it was permis110.
sible under the Constitution to humiliate these Plaintiffs solely because one of them had legitimately
exercised her right of free speech at another time and place.").
Ill.
Id. at 1172 ("Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights on a pretext so flimsy that the violation
was obvious.").
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President's speech.1 2 Furthermore, Judge Holloway argued that the
plaintiffs were not speakers at the public event, so the defendants' argument-that the President has a right to control his own message-is inapplicable in this instance." 3 Rather, Judge Holloway concluded that the
plaintiffs were ejected solely on the basis of Weise's protected expression; therefore, such an ejection, therefore, contrasted starkly with any
reasonable application of the First Amendment."14 Judge Holloway
wrote:
It is simply astounding, that any member of the executive branch
could have believed that our Constitution justified this egregious violation of Plaintiffs rights. "The right of an American citizen to criticize public officials and policies and to advocate peacefully ideas for
change is the centralmeaning of the FirstAmendment.""
IV. WEISE V. CASPER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In deciding Weise v. Casper, the Tenth Circuit made two questionable jurisprudential decisions. First, when considered in light of the novelty concerns in Hope v. Pelzer, the court took an incomplete approach to
the "clearly established" prong of qualified immunity. Second, the court
also took an incomplete approach to the issue of viewpoint discrimination in the context of First Amendment precedent. The Tenth Circuit's
incomplete approach to these legal questions ultimately led to an incorrect decision in Weise v. Casper. The court set qualified immunity precedent that imposed a higher burden on civil rights plaintiffs. Moreover,
the court missed an opportunity to construe the First Amendment in favor of active citizens, and instead offered a precedent that offers increased protections for the questionable actions of government officials.
Consequently, the Weise decision makes the Tenth Circuit a potential
outlier and raises concerns of muted citizenship in light of expanded
governmental discretion.
A. An Incomplete QualifiedImmunity Analysis

As detailed above, qualified immunity inquiries involve nuanced
questions of law and fact. Courts considering a defense of qualified immunity must evaluate the facts in light of two criteria: whether a right
was clearly established, and whether a violation of that right occurred. '6
In light of the facts, courts must decide which criterion should be ad-

112.
113.

Id. at il71.
Id. at 1175-76.

114.

Id at 1171.

115. Id (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
116. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
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dressed first.'" 7 When considering facts related to clearly established
rights, courts must also balance concerns of precedential notice with factual novelty."l8
Following Harlow and Pearson,the majority in Weise employed the
two-pronged qualified immunity test and elected to first address the issue
of a clearly established right." 9 Relying on precedent, the court noted
that a clearly established right exists when the law would put "a reasonable official on notice that his conduct was unlawful."l20 The remainder
of the "clearly established" analysis focused on the dispute's factual eccentricities in light of precedential authority. The majority stated that no
First Amendment doctrine prohibited executive officials from excluding
the plaintiffs from a speech on private property. 121 They further held that
no authority spoke to the specific issue of ejection based on noncontemporaneous expression.122 While the plaintiffs did offer factually
similar cases upholding the right of expression at public forums, the
court held that these cases were distinguishable because each involved
speech within the actual forum. Based on this lack of analogous precedent, the majority concluded that "no specific authority instructs this
court (let alone a reasonable public official) how to treat the ejection of a
silent attendee from an official speech based on the attendee's protected
expression outside the speech area." 23
While accurate in its conclusions on precedent, the court's full
analysis is incomplete because it neglects the novelty considerations outlined by the Supreme Court in Lanier and Hope. As the Court reasoned
in Lanier, general statements of law are capable of giving public officials
fair warning of unlawful action. 12 4 The Court then formalized this idea in
Hope by stating that unlawful conduct can be apparent "even in novel
factual circumstances."l 25 The Weise court briefly noted these concerns
when describing the qualified immunity inquiry.126 However, the court
never considered the idea of novelty in the factual context of Weise. Af117. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (referencing Groh v. Ramirez, 540
U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
118. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753-54 (2002).
119. See Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7.
120. Id. at 1167-68 (citing Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-199 (2004) (per curiam)).
121.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168 ("Plaintiffs simply have not identified any First Amendment
doctrine that prohibits the government from excluding them from an official speech on private
property on the basis of their viewpoint.").
122. Id. at 1169-70 (discussing federal cases that upheld expressive activity in public forums
absent actual disruptive activity).
123. Id. at 1170.
124. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) ("[G]eneral statements of the law are
not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct in question, even though 'the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful . . . ."' (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))).
125. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
126. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1169 (noting the controlling concerns of novelty as expressed in
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, and Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
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ter concluding that no authority spoke to the facts of the case, the court
ruled in favor of the defendants and never examined whether the plaintiffs' ejection from a public speech by the President constituted novel
factual circumstances.1 27
This incomplete inquiry ultimately led to an incorrect result on the
qualified immunity issue. By failing to examine the novelty question, the
Weise court overlooked the possibility that First Amendment precedent
gave Casper and other volunteers notice as to the unlawfulness of their
actions. As the court correctly concluded, no precedent fully encapsulates the factual circumstances of Weise; however, the court's analysis
never progressed to considerations of novelty. A reasonable observer
would likely conclude that absence of fully analogous precedent is itself
a strong indicator of novelty. Additionally, the unique facts of Weise and
Young's ejection also signal that novelty should be a relevant consideration. However, the majority did not consider whether Weise implicates
the novelty concerns of Lanier and Hope. In failing to address this issue,
the court employed an incomplete approach to the qualified immunity
issue: the court enforced the reasonableness requirement protecting public officials, yet omitted an analysis of the novelty considerations that
protect plaintiffs pleading unique factual scenarios. Consequently, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs legitimate argument of novelty and issued
a ruling that lacks the foundation of a complete qualified immunity
analysis.
B. An Incomplete FirstAmendment Analysis
The First Amendment flatly prohibits government discrimination on
the basis of viewpoint. 12 8 Political opinion is particularly shielded from
retaliatory state action, 129 and the body of law surrounding this idea is
clear, consistent, and robust.13 0 As Judge Holloway accurately remarked
in his dissenting opinion in Weise, "The prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination is unquestionably well established."13 1
The majority in Weise acknowledges that viewpoint discrimination
is generally prohibited. 13 2 However, the majority did little else to examine the plaintiffs' claim as a broad question of viewpoint discrimination,
even going so far as to say that a general discussion of viewpoint dis127. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168-70.
128. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (1975) ("The right of an American
129.
citizen to criticize public officials and policies and to advocate peacefully ideas for change is 'the
central meaning of the First Amendment."' (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273
(1964))); see also id. at 912 ("A more invidious classification than that between persons who support
government officials and their policies and those who are critical of them is difficult to imagine.").
130. See supra PartII.
131.
See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1177 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1167 (majority opinion) ("At the most general level, Plaintiffs are correct that the
government usually cannot discriminate against a speaker based upon that speaker's viewpoint.").
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crimination was unwarranted. 3 3 Instead, the court examined the narrow
question of whether the plaintiffs' attendance at a president's public
speech was protected from retaliation based on prior speech.13 4 The majority found no instructive authority on the issue.1 3 5 Ultimately, the court
ruled in favor of the defendants without discussing the ejection in terms
of discrimination on the basis of political viewpoint.136
As with the district court's qualified immunity analysis, the Tenth
Circuit's analysis of the viewpoint discrimination issue was incomplete.
In this instance, the incompleteness led to an unsound decision on the
First Amendment issues in Weise. First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly in the context of viewpoint discrimination, is clear in its prohibition of government reprisal against dissenting citizens. Weise's bumper
sticker expressed a dissenting opinion with respect to American foreign
policy. As the defendants admitted, the plaintiffs were ejected solely on
the basis of Weise's bumper sticker; there was no indication of present or
future disruptive activity on the part of either plaintiff.13 7 Moreover, the
decision to remove the plaintiffs from the museum was made in conjunction with an executive policy designed to bar attendance by political dissenters.' 38 Given the circumstances, this ejection can only be described as
a retaliatory action against those who held a viewpoint contrary to that of
the executive branch. In light of the strong body of law that prohibits
such retaliation, obvious problems with the Tenth Circuit's ruling arise.
Such a narrow holding that focuses on the mere time an opinion is expressed forsakes the larger demands of the First Amendment. By employing this incomplete approach, the court incorrectly analyzed the
case's freedom of expression issues and consequently dismissed a meritorious civil rights claim.
C. Effects of the Tenth Circuit'sRuling
On October 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Weise and
Young's petition for certiorari. 139 The Weise case would likely have produced an interesting result at the Supreme Court, especially given the
Roberts Court's expansive interpretation of the First Amendment.1 40 Te
133. Id at 1169 ("[The] discussion of impermissible viewpoint discrimination does not amount
to clearly established law that provides guidance in these circumstances.").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1169-70.
136. Id. at 1170.
137. Id at 1165 (noting that the Secret Service told Weise and Young that the bumper sticker
prompted their ejection and that Mr. Young would only have spoken at the event if given the opportunity to ask the President a question).
138. Id.
139. Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7, 7-8 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (holding that a statutory
ban of animal cruelty videos is overly broad under the First Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment bars statutory limits on corporate
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fact remains, however, that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Weise is realistically the final word on the matter. As such, the decision will leave a
major legacy for legal actors in the Tenth Circuit. By employing a narrow approach to the issues in Weise, the majority's decision represents a
shift in Circuit jurisprudence with respect to qualified immunity and
viewpoint discrimination questions. Although the true depth of this shift
remain unclear, some conclusions still present themselves: if given the
weight of controlling precedent, Weise will substantially affect the fortunes of future civil rights litigants, chill the mechanisms of an active
citizenry, and stunt the growth of new Constitutional norms.
1. A Shift in Circuit Law
As discussed above, the Weise court approached the questions of
qualified immunity and viewpoint discrimination in an incomplete manner. 14 1 If applied to future litigants, this incomplete approach will have a
powerful effect on claims of qualified immunity and First Amendment
rights within the Tenth Circuit.
First, litigants seeking the enforcement of civil rights against state
or federal officials may find that defeating a claim of qualified immunity
requires a higher reliance on factual precedent than prior to Weise. This
heightened burden results from the Tenth Circuit's strict comparison of
Weise and Young's claim to previous qualified immunity cases. This
stringent analysis represents a genuine departure from the typical consideration of novelty concerns. It is reasonable to see the novelty factor as a
balancing component of qualified immunity law rather than a narrow and
inconsequential exception.142 However, the Tenth Circuit's approach in
Weise treats the idea of novel circumstances with token mention rather
than careful balancing. As a result, the court imposes the tremendous
burden on Weise and Young to find precedent establishing the right to be
present at a public Presidential speech regardless of previously expressed
political viewpoint. 143
If the incomplete qualified immunity approach in Weise becomes
controlling authority in the Tenth Circuit, future civil rights litigants in
the Tenth Circuit will now shoulder the burden of finding factually identical precedent. Courts within the Circuit will, by default, be more perelectioneering expenditures); see generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1250-73 (2010).
141.
See supraPartlV.
142. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 111 (2010) (including novel factual circumstances as a
preliminary rather than secondary inquiry in qualified immunity cases); Jacob Heller, Abominable
Acts, 34 VT. L. REV. 311, 316-337 (2009) (arguing for reform of the "clearly established" test
because knowledge of wrongfulness can be presumed even in novel circumstances); Paul W.
Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-SaucierSequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional
Rights, 80 U. COLo. L. REV. 401, 418-29 (2009) (urging the re-implementation of a subjective
qualified immunity inquiry, in part because courts are now less likely to find constitutional violations unless the factual scenario has been clearly established).
143.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1169-70.
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suaded by factual circumstance rather than Constitutional claim. Consequently, Bivens and § 1983 plaintiffs will find that their fortunes are increasingly tied to whether the facts of their claim have been previously
litigated. On the other hand, defendants asserting qualified immunity will
have the stringent novelty analysis of the Weise court as an extra arrow
in their litigious quiver.
The second circuit-wide effect of the Weise decision relates to the
now-diminished protections for expressive citizens from government
reprisal. The court's narrow reading of the facts obscured the reality of
retaliatory action by government officials on the basis of political viewpoint. 144 Because Weise's expressive activity was not within the confines
of the Presidential event, the majority held that it was not protected
speech and thus not subject to immediate protection from reprisal. 145
Should this minutiae-driven approach become the circuit norm, it would
redraw the traditional battle lines of viewpoint discrimination jurisprudence; the flat prohibition on government reprisal for political expression
may become a malleable concept in the Tenth Circuit. What Justice Jackson once called a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation" 46 would
become more akin to a traveling comet, drifting in and out of relevance
depending on present circumstances.
If claims of viewpoint discrimination become a more fact-specific
inquiry, parties to future disputes will encounter altered legal terrain.
Public officials who exclude or deprive on the basis of viewpoint will
receive greater protections, so long as their actions do not exactly mirror
the previous actions of officials who were denied qualified immunity.
Where defendants can identify a factual peculiarity involving contemporaneity, proximity, or manner, their actions are much less likely to be
considered retaliatory. Conversely, plaintiffs claiming viewpoint discrimination must again plead their case on the basis of factual similarity.
If the expressive activity in question presents unique questions of circumstance, future plaintiffs will face an uphill battle in convincing a
Tenth Circuit court that their expression should be shielded from governmental retaliation.
2. Cause for Concern
A shift in circuit approach is not in itself a reason for alarm. The
Weise decision, however, should give pause to practitioners and scholars
alike. When courts apply incomplete legal approaches and neglect a
complete legal analysis, there is a high risk of contravening wellestablished legal and societal norms. Judicial tunnel vision, therefore, can
carry unfortunate consequences. In Weise, the Tenth Circuit falls prey to
144.
145.
146.

See supra Part IV.B.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 168-70.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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this hazard. The court's incomplete qualified immunity inquiry raises
troubling issues of accountability for public officials. By narrowing its
First Amendment analysis, the court also eroded judicial protection for
active citizenship. Additionally, both of these narrow approaches stymie
the development of civil rights within the Tenth Circuit. Ultimately, the
Weise decision represents a missed opportunity for the court to properly
balance legal considerations and move the circuit in a progressive direction on civil rights matters.
First, the qualified immunity approach of the court leads to a troubling situation where public officials can erect an insurmountable wall
against a plaintiffs civil rights claim. While the doctrine of qualified
immunity exists to protect reasonable public officials from frivolous
claims, 147 the defense is not meant to serve as an impenetrable shield
against all civil rights claims. If plaintiffs are required to find factually
identical precedent, however, qualified immunity remains qualified in
name only. The main purpose of Bivens and § 1983 claims is to remedy a
violation of a plaintiffs civil rights at the hands of state or federal officials. 14 8 Giving these officials a virtually impenetrable defense does little
to serve the purpose of the claim. The absence of meaningful novelty
analysis in Weise, if used as a template for future cases, gives public officials higher levels of protection by imposing a higher burden of factual
persuasion on civil rights plaintiffs; only factual scenarios that have been
previously litigated stand a realistic chance of succeeding in court. Consequently, Bivens and § 1983 actions become empty remedies for the
victims of constitutional torts.
The Weise decision is also troubling because it chills the mechanisms of an active citizenry. The majority departed from First Amendment precedent and engaged in a fact-specific analysis that never identified Weise's bumper sticker as expressive of a protected viewpoint.149
The consequences of this narrow approach are notable. The right to express dissenting viewpoints is central to the purpose and meaning of the
First Amendment.150 In practice, this right assures that citizens are able to
speak out on matters of public concern without fear of government repri-

147. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("It is the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with goodfaith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct."); Littman, supra note 12, at 648-49 ("The qualified immunity defense
balances the public's interest in effectively vindicating constitutional guarantees with the state's
equally strong countervailing interest in protecting officials from the threat of liability when performing official duties.").
148. See supra note 21.
Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168-70.
149.
150. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-74 (1964); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975); Buchanan, supra note 56.
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5 If the incomplete First Amendment inquiry in Weise becomes the
sal.s'
circuit norm, political dissent becomes a more loosely protected form of
expression. Unless the dissenting expression is clearly made at the time
of the alleged retaliatory acts, or unless the expression is made in a traditional manner, plaintiffs will have greater difficulties in proving impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Essentially, this creates a form of
second-class citizenship for citizens whose beliefs run contrary to orthodox political thought. These citizens will find the judiciary less able to
protect their expression from retaliatory state action, and government
officials will in turn have wider latitude to discriminate against those
with dissenting beliefs.

Last, there are concerns in the area of legal development. If the
Tenth Circuit employs narrow approaches to questions of qualified immunity and viewpoint discrimination, it will be more difficult for new
Constitutional rules to emerge. When the novelty factor of Lanier and
Hope is largely bypassed, qualified immunity becomes the default ruling
for novel factual situations. If unique facts of time and manner control
viewpoint discrimination inquiries, only the most obvious situations of
expression and retaliation will warrant constitutional protection. Such
circumstances effectively halt the development of legal precedent-only
previously litigated disputes involving qualified immunity or viewpoint
discrimination will be controlling in the future. Essentially, this means
that the constitutional articulation of new rights is suppressed. If every
nuance of qualified immunity or viewpoint discrimination law had been
explored, this suppression would scarcely be cause for worry. However,
the idea that all possible scenarios or substantive rights have been explored in any area of the law is fundamentally unsound. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Teague v. Lanel52 stated that it was
unlikely that new due process rights would emerge for criminal defendants. 153 The development of criminal procedure has proven this statement false. 154 In situations of qualified immunity and viewpoint discrimination, it would be similarly unwise to assume that new circumstances warranting a denial of qualified immunity or First Amendment
protection will not present themselves. The Weise decision, however, is
concerning because it precludes new developments in the law and
thereby runs contrary to the idea of common law adjudication within the
Tenth Circuit.
See Yassky, supra note 7, at 1710-13 (noting that, while originally crafted to guarantee
151.
states' independence, the First Amendment evolved into a source of personal rights following the
national controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1797 and 1798).
152. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
153. Id. at 313.
154. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-162 (1994) (finding post-Teague
that a capital defendant's due process rights were violated when a jury considering the death penalty
was not instructed that life imprisonment carried no possibility of parole); see generally Linda
Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 459-92 (1994)
(arguing that the logic of Teague was flawed because new due process rights are inevitable).
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CONCLUSION

Weise v. Casper is a case that will affect Tenth Circuit jurisprudence in many ways. Unfortunately, the decision's effects are cause for
concern rather than celebration. In foregoing a thorough novelty analysis,
the majority diminished the precedential value of Lanier and Hope
within the Circuit. Also, the Weise court narrowed its viewpoint discrimination analysis by focusing exclusively on facts of time and manner. If the reasoning in Weise is applied in future cases, the effect of
these narrow approaches is three-fold. First, plaintiffs seeking to defeat a
claim of qualified immunity will now be largely bound by the facts of
their claim. This implicates concerns of official accountability for unconstitutional acts. Second, claims of viewpoint discrimination will be
handicapped by factual discrepancies from previous cases. This altered
legal landscape risks the creation of second-class citizenship for political
dissenters. Third, both of these narrow approaches threaten the development of future constitutional law; if litigants are bound to bring claims
that are completely identical to previous cases, it is unlikely that new
rules and rights will develop when necessary. Overall, Weise v. Casperis
a case that could mark the beginning of troubling constitutional developments in the Tenth Circuit.
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